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Abstract
Non-transitivity can arise in games with three or more strategies A,B,C,
when A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A, (A > B > C > A). An example
is the children’s game “rock, scissors, paper” (R,S, P ) where R > S > P > R.
We discuss the conditions under which quantum versions of R,S, P retain
the non-transitive characteristics of the corresponding classical game. Some
physical implications of non-transitivity in quantum game theory are also
considered.
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Recent years have witnessed a rapid growth of interest in quantum game theory, moti-
vated in part by potential applications to quantum computing. Quantum games are gener-
ally derived from the corresponding classical games by introducing some inherently quan-
tum mechanical feature (such as superposition of states [1] or entanglement [2]), which can
be incorporated in more than one way. In a 2-player game, where each player has two
pure strategies available, a widely discussed scheme for entanglement is that due to Eisert,
Wilkins, and Lewenstein (EWL) [3]. The object of the present paper is to discuss 2-player
games with three pure strategies (A,B,C) using the EWL formalism for entanglement. The
novel feature of such games is that they allow for the possibility of non-transitive strate-
gies (A > B > C > A). It is well known that non-transitivity arises in classical games
[4] and in real-world applications, and can lead to surprising -and seemingly paradoxical -
outcomes. This naturally leads to the question of whether similar non-transitive effects arise
in quantum versions of classical games and, if so, whether similarly unexpected effects can
be present at the quantum level.
A simple 2-player, 3-strategy game is the children’s choosing game “rock (R), scissors
(S), paper (P )” in which rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, and paper beats rock
(R > S > P > R). A payoff matrix for the 3 strategies of this zero-sum game is shown in
Table I. (Quantum games with 3 × 3 payoff matrices and larger have have been discussed
by Wang, et al. [5].) We can formulate a quantum analog of this game by using the EWL
entanglement formalism. In the quantum version of this game the strategies R, S, and P are
represented by three matrices which act on qubits from which payoffs are determined. The
quantum game can be played as follows: In the absence of entanglement each player (Alice
and Bob) is given a separate copy of the same qubit which is in one of three orthogonal
states denoted by |100〉, |010〉, or |001〉. Without loss of generality we assume that the same
qubit is used for the initial state in every game. This qubit can then be manipulated by
any of three matrices denoted by R, S, and P , each of which rotates the initial state into
one of the three orthogonal states. Once both players have implemented their strategies (R,
S, or P ), the final qubits for both players are compared using the payoff matrix in Table
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I. An examination of this Table shows that R > S > P > R. In the EWL formalism the
qubits are entangled by an operator before the players act on them with R, S, or P , and
then disentangled afterwards. Since the EWL entanglement operator commutes with any
direct-product combination of R, S, and P , the net effect of introducing entanglement in
this manner is to produce a quantum game whose outcomes are identical to those of the
corresponding classical game.
If a game is repeated many times, a competitor may elect to play any of R, S, or P in
each game, and in such a circumstance quantum games can be formulated in which payoff
functions unique to quantum mechanics may result. If the probabilities for the actions R, S,
or P are pR, pS, and pP respectively, a player is said to be adopting a mixed strategy. Two
ways of incorporating mixed strategies in quantum games can be considered, and these lead
in general to different outcomes. In one approach, pR, pS, and pP are simply the classical
probabilities of using each of the quantum operators R, S, or P . By contrast, the second
approach combines the operators R, S, or P and the respective probability amplitudes into
a single matrix. The difference in the two constructions can be illustrated in the 2× 2 case
(Alice’s 2 choices × Bob’s 2 choices): In the former approach each player would have only
two options (N = no− flip and F = flip) for each game,
N =


1 0
0 1

 , F =


0 1
1 0

 , (1)
which act on the initial game state, either (10) or (01). Assigning a classical probability p to
using N and (1− p) to using F would then define a mixed strategy. It should be noted that
other choices for N and F are interesting to study [6], but we shall restrict our discussion
to those given in Eq. (1). This entanglement technique requires that a player make a choice
in each game. A maximized entanglement operation, J , can be introduced into such a game
that commutes with any direct-product combination of N and F but does not commute
with a general matrix,
J =
1√
2
(N ⊗N) + i√
2
(F ⊗ F ), (2)
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where N ⊗ N = N(Alice) ⊗ N(Bob), etc.. Payoff functions for both players unique to
quantum mechanics are possible if either player cheats by using neither N nor F .
In the second approach the actions available to each player, along with the probability
amplitudes for selecting them, are built into the single unitary matrix U ,
U =


√
p −√1− p
√
1− p √p

 =


cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ

 , (3)
Once p = p(θ) has been chosen, a game can be played many times without the player making
any future decisions. An entanglement matrix for such a game was provided by EWL,
J =
1√
2
(N ⊗N) + i√
2
(F ′ ⊗ F ′), (4)
where
F ′ =


0 −1
1 0

 . (5)
Before turning to the 3-strategy case we note that although some properties of quantum
games are identical to those of classical games [7], the EWL entanglement technique can
lead to payoff functions that cannot be reproduced in a classical game. Consider a situation
where each player introduces an additional phase, φ, to his/her play:
U(θ, φ) =


eiφ cos θ − sin θ
sin θ e−iφ cos θ

 (6)
The final expected payoff function, $¯a, for Alice is
$¯a = a11[c
2
ac
2
b cos
2 (φa + φb)] (7)
+a10(casb cos φa − sacb sin φb)2
+a01(sacb cos φb − casb sinφa)2
+a00[sasb + cacb sin (φa + φb)]
2,
where φa(φb) is the additional phase for Alice(Bob), ca = cos θa, sa = sin θa and the
′a′s
are Alice’s payoff coefficients. For non-zero but fixed values of φa and φb Alice’s payoff is
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non-linear in pa = c
2
a, whereas a classical 2×2 game produces only payoff functions that are
linear in pa.
The 2× 2 EWL entanglement formalism can be easily shown to work equally well with
either formulation of a mixed strategy. However, in the 3× 3 case (2 players with 3 choices
each), these approaches require different entanglement matrices as we now discuss. We begin
by exhibiting the 3× 3 analog of the operators N and F in Eq. (1) which we take to be:
U1 =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1


, U2 =


0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0


, U3 =


0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0


, (8)
where [U2, U3] = 0. The players use these matrices in different spaces to act on initial wave
functions such as |11〉 = (100)a⊗ (100)b. The analog of the first approach for constructing a
mixed strategy is for each player to assign classical probabilities pi to each of the Ui where
∑
pi = 1. (Other choices for these matrices lead to identical results.) The commutativity of
U1, U2 and U3 can be exploited to create a mixing matrix similar to that of EWL [3].
In direct analogy to Eq. (2), a choice for the unitary entanglement matrix, J , that
commutes with any direct product combination of these three matrices is:
J =
−1
3
U1 ⊗ U1 + 2
3
U2 ⊗ U2 + 2
3
U3 ⊗ U3 (9)
=


−1
3
0 0 0 2
3
0 0 0 2
3
0 −1
3
0 0 0 2
3
2
3
0 0
0 0 −1
3
2
3
0 0 0 2
3
0
0 0 2
3
−1
3
0 0 0 2
3
0
2
3
0 0 0 −1
3
0 0 0 2
3
0 2
3
0 0 0 −1
3
2
3
0 0
0 2
3
0 0 0 2
3
−1
3
0 0
0 0 2
3
2
3
0 0 0 −1
3
0
2
3
0 0 0 2
3
0 0 0 −1
3


,
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where U1⊗U1 ≡ U1(Alice)⊗U1(Bob), etc.. The entanglement matrix in Eq. (9) is designed
to be used in a game where players randomly select an action for each game based on
classical probabilities associated with a defined mixed strategy. This matrix entangles the
qubits while still obeying the appropriate commutation relations,
0 = [J, Ui ⊗ Uj] ∀ i, j. (10)
Unlike the 2 × 2 case, an initial eigenstate does not become fully entangled by this matrix.
The initial state |11〉, for example, is transformed into
J |11〉 = −1
3
|11〉+ 2
3
|00〉+ 2
3
| − 1− 1〉. (11)
If each amplitude is denoted as ci, then the degree of entanglement (as measured by von
Neumann entropy [8]), E, is:
E = −∑
i
|ci|2 log3 |ci|2 = 0.88 (12)
where log base 3 is used to ensure that maximum entanglement corresponds to E = 1.
A generic entanglement matrix can be constructed for an N ×N game. Let U1,U2,...UN
(UiUj = Ui+j , U
†
i = U−i and UN+1 = U1) be commuting and orthogonal matrices, each capa-
ble of directly transforming an initial state into an eigenstate of some specified Hamiltonian.
The elements of each matrix are taken to be either 0 or 1. If J is assumed to have the form
J =
N∑
i=1
αiUi ⊗ Ui, (13)
then
JJ† =
N∑
i=1
αiUi ⊗ Ui
N∑
j=1
α∗jU
†
j ⊗ U †j , (14)
= 11⊗ 11
N∑
k=1
|αk|2 +
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
N∑
j=1
αiα
∗
jUiU
†
j ⊗ UiU †j . (15)
Unitarity requires that (1)
1 =
N∑
k=1
|αk|2, (16)
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and (2) that
0 =
N∑
i=1
N−1∑
j=0
αiα
∗
jUiU
†
j ⊗ UiU †j . (17)
If s ≡ i− j, then the second unitarity condition becomes
0 =
N∑
j=1
αs+jα
∗
jUs ⊗ Us ∀ s[1, N − 1], (18)
= Us ⊗ Us
N∑
j=1
αs+jα
∗
j ∀ s[1, N − 1], (19)
or
0 =
N∑
j=1
αs+jα
∗
j ∀ s[1, N − 1]. (20)
For the N = 3 case, α1 = −1/3, α2 = α3 = 2/3 is one solution to the the unitarity
requirements. For the general N ×N case, the combination of Eqs. (16) and (20) thus leads
to an expression for the αi in Eq. (13), and hence to an appropriate expression for J .
The 3×3 game that we consider is “rock, scissors, paper” (R,S,P) shown in Table I which
has the interesting non-transitive property (R > S > P > R). As shown in the Table, a
payoff of +1 has been assigned to winning, −1 to losing, and 0 for both in case of a tie. It is
well known that in a 2×2 game such as the “prisoner’s dilemma”, a player using a quantum
strategy can improve his/her expected payoff provided that his/her opponent continues to
use a classical strategy. The question then arises whether this can also happen in a 3 × 3
game which is non-transitive at the classical level. To address this question we note that
the generic matrix, Jˆ ,
Jˆ = α1U1 ⊗ U1 + α2U2 ⊗ U2 + α3U3 ⊗ U3 (21)
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=

a 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 b
0 a 0 0 0 c b 0 0
0 0 a c 0 0 0 b 0
0 0 b a 0 0 0 c 0
b 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 c
0 b 0 0 0 a c 0 0
0 c 0 0 0 b a 0 0
0 0 c b 0 0 0 a 0
c 0 0 0 b 0 0 0 a


has no effect on the payoff matrix because it transforms eigenstates to others with identical
payoffs. It follows from this discussion that the matrix J in Eq. (9), which satisfies all the
criteria for a mixing matrix in 3 × 3 games, produces outcomes for the quantum version of
the non-transitive game R, S, P which are identical to those for the classical game. Since
this conclusion also holds for the generic matrix Jˆ in Eq. (21) (assuming unitarity), we
can conclude that the quantum versions of R, S, P constructed from J or Jˆ will retain the
non-transitive behavior present in the classical game. We emphasize, however, that the
application of J or Jˆ to other 3 × 3 games can be expected to produce quantum games
whose outcomes are generally different from those of the corresponding classical game.
Since the survival of non-transitivity in the quantum domain is a fundamental feature
in 3 × 3 games, we present an alternative proof of this result which clarifies some of the
underlying assumptions. We assume that Alice uses a strategy (which is separable into a
product of ’classical’ and ’quantum’ operators), Q′ = UiQ, for every game and that Bob
uses some ’classical’ strategy Uj . In this case, the final game state is
|ψf〉 = J†b [UiQ⊗ Uj ]Jb|11〉. (22)
If |ψjq〉 ≡ J†b [Q⊗ 11]Jb|11〉 then the final state becomes
|ψf〉 = Ui ⊗ Uj |ψjq〉. (23)
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Non-transitivity survives because Bob is still able to win regardless of what Alice does: he
can turn any advantage that Alice creates with Q into an advantage to himself simply by
choosing another Uj . It is important to note that, unlike the “prisoner’s dilemma”, the use
of quantum strategies by both players cannot be mutually beneficial to both players because
the game is zero sum.
In the preceding discussion we considered non-transitive 3 × 3 games in a framework
analogous to that following Eq. (1) in the 2×2 case. We turn next to a quantum formulation
of 3×3 games analogous to that following from Eq. (3). It can be shown that the preceding
proof of non-transitivity survives for this formulation as well. The matrix that can be used
to transform an initial eigenstate into any other eigenstate is generated by the following
matrices, which are Hermitian and unitary,
H1 =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0


, H2 =


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1


. (24)
Each player can use the matrix U(x, y),
U(x, y) = eixH1eiyH2 (25)
=


eix cos y ieix sin y 0
i sin y cos x cosx cos y ieiy sin x
− sin y sin x i sin x cos y eiy cosx


(26)
to transform an initial state, |1〉 = (100), into any other state to simulate a pure strategy.
For this choice of U(x, y) the additional phases that have been introduced have no net effect
on probabilities or payoff functions. The choices of x and y define a player’s mixed strategy
in a 3 × 3 game, just as the choice of θ [Eq. (3)] does in the 2 × 2 game. U(x, y) satisfies
the commutation relation 0 = [U(x, y), F ′′], where
F ′′ =
1
3


−1 2 2
2 −1 2
2 2 −1


. (27)
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Because F ′′ and U(x, y) commute, so do F ′′ ⊗ F ′′ and U(xa, ya) ⊗ U(xb, yb), where xa and
ya (xb and yb) define Alice’s (Bob’s) mixed strategy. This suggests the introduction of the
following (maximally entangled) mixing matrix,
J¯ = e−ipi/4F
′′⊗F ′′ =
1√
2
[11⊗ 11− iF ′′ ⊗ F ′′] (28)
which commutes with any U(xa, ya) ⊗ U(xb, yb). The matrix J¯ in Eq. (28) is the exact
3× 3 analog of the entanglement matrix used by EWL in their discussion of the “prisoner’s
dilemma” [3]. There is considerable freedom on the part of each player in how he/she chooses
to deviate from U(x, y), since a variable equivalent to φ can be introduced into a player’s
transformation matrix in numerous ways.
In summary, we have developed a formalism for dealing with entanglement in 3 × 3
quantum games, when each player adopts a mixed strategy. Although this formalism can
be applied to any N × N game, our focus in this paper has been on the simplest non-
transitive 3 × 3 game. As noted above, classical non-transitive games are of great interest,
since they can lead to seemingly paradoxical results in real-world examples [4]. One of the
central results of the present paper is that non-transitivity survives in the quantum versions
of the corresponding games. This naturally raises the question of whether similar apparent
paradoxes can arise in physically realizable quantum systems. Although this question cannot
be answered definitively at the present time, physical systems exist which exhibit the non-
transitive features of both the “voter’s paradox” and the “Penney paradox” [4]. As we
discuss elsewhere [9], tables of Clebsch-Gordan coefficients have properties similar to those
of the magic square, whose non-transitive properties underlie the “voter’s paradox”. It is
thus possible that interesting non-transitive effects may arise in ensembles of particles with
non-zero angular momenta whose behavior can be modeled by the 3×3 non-transitive games
that we have presented here.
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TABLE I. In the zero-sum game of “rock, scissors, paper”, a player can win regardless of the
strategy chosen by an opponent. The first number in each entry of the Table is Alice’s payoff and
the second is Bob’s. Winning strategies are non-transitive in that R > S > P > R.
Bob
R S P
R (0, 0) (1,−1) (−1, 1)
Alice S (−1, 1) (0, 0) (1,−1)
P (1,−1) (−1, 1) (0, 0)
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